Researchers report classical attack breaking textbook RSA without integer factoring

The short version

• Researchers have developed a classical signature forgery method that bypasses traditional integer factoring to compromise textbook RSA encryption.[Slashdot · Ars Technica]
• The attack targets blind-signature implementations, lowering security levels for 1024-bit, 2048-bit, and 4096-bit keys below standard regulatory thresholds.[Slashdot]
• Widely used, standard RSA implementations remain safe, presenting minimal immediate practical risk to mainstream cryptography.[Slashdot · Ars Technica]

Key facts

• The novel attack uses signature forgery on classical hardware rather than integer factoring.[Slashdot · Ars Technica]
• The method reduces security levels for 1024-bit, 2048-bit, and 4096-bit keys to 2^65, 2^90, and 2^119 respectively, falling below the standard 128-bit security baseline.[Slashdot]
• The attack specifically targets blind-signature implementations and does not compromise standard, widely used RSA implementations.[Slashdot · Ars Technica]
• Testing against 1024-bit keys was completed in several months using an academic CPU cluster without GPU or AI acceleration.[Slashdot]

Sources

Outlet counts describe coverage, not independent confirmation. Reports may share a wire service or original source.

• There's a new way to break RSA that's faster than anything we've seen beforeArs Technica
• There's a New Way to Break RSA EncryptionSlashdot